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 Non-technical summary 
Individuals who want to become entrepreneurs need to spend time on an important as-
pect: risk. They risk not only their financial well-being, their career, their family relations, 
but also their physical well-being. Indeed, asking nascent entrepreneurs about anxieties 
preventing them from becoming entrepreneurs at the end, they prominently refer to fi-
nancial risks. However, is their fear justified? How likely is it that entrepreneurs suffer 
private losses from business closure? And what does it mean for their entrepreneurial 
career if private losses occur? May it even be more likely that losses at other stake-
holders are more important for an entrepreneurs’ further entrepreneurial career? 
Financial losses arising from business closure can befall various stakeholders: sharehold-
ers, banks and public institutions, or suppliers and other stakeholders. It is reasonable to 
expect that financial losses impact the likelihood of a restart as a function of the stake-
holders who have been forced to bear losses. Because most start-ups rely on entrepre-
neurs’ own capital there is a high probability that entrepreneurs themselves are finan-
cially affected by loss-making business closures. This would, as a consequence, reduce 
their personal wealth, the fundament of future actions. However, it is of twofold impor-
tance if banks suffer losses. First, losses at banks are likely to be strong correlated with 
personal losses of the entrepreneurs reducing entrepreneurs’ personal wealth. Second, 
losses at banks are “public” debts impeding the chance of credit from other banks. Both 
are bad for restart feasibility. 
Multivariate analyses reveal that the occurrence of private losses of the entrepreneurs 
does not affect the restart likelihood. Losses are merely important if they arise at banks 
or public institutions. Then, restart is less likely. This effect may be the result of the role 
that banks play with respect to start-up financing, where they are often the first address 
to turn on. Furthermore, the type of closure matters. Restart probability is higher if the 
closure was result of management disagreements. Surprisingly, restart probability is in-
dependent from closure types that can be considered a business failure. This means, that 
if closures took place because the business development does not meet the entrepre-
neurs’ target thresholds of performance or because of liquidity problems or excessive 
debts arose, restart likelihood is not affected significantly. This was not expected since 
other studies show that restart is less likely in the case of business failure. However, it 
might be that there the closure type measures capture effects that actually come from 
incurred losses for which it was not controlled. 
The major finding of this analysis is that financial losses due to business closure are im-
portant for the occurrence of an entrepreneurial restart – if the losses incur at banks. 
This has an important implication for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs who want to continue 
their entrepreneurial career after a business closure should avoid losses at banks or pub-
lic institutions. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Mit einer unternehmerischen Selbstständigkeit gehen viele unterschiedliche Risiken ein-
her: finanzielle, berufliche, familiäre, oder gesundheitliche Risiken. Trotz der Fülle an Ri-
siken steht bei den meisten angehenden Unternehmern jedoch die Sorge vor dem finan-
ziellen Risiko im Vordergrund. Die Frage ist, ob diese Sorge gerechtfertigt ist. Wie wahr-
scheinlich ist es, dass eine Unternehmensschließung finanzielle Verluste für den Unter-
nehmer mit sich bringt? Was würden solche privaten finanziellen Verluste für ihre weitere 
unternehmerische Karriere bedeuten? Welche Auswirkungen haben Verluste, die die Un-
ternehmer nicht selbst tragen müssen, auf deren weitere unternehmerische Karriere? 
Tatsächlich kann erwartet werden, dass die Auswirkung finanzieller Verluste, die durch 
eine Unternehmensschließung entstehen, auf die weitere unternehmerische Karriere der 
Selbstständigen davon abhängt, wer die Verluste zu tragen hat. Weil im Allgemeinen kei-
ne Unternehmensgründung ohne Eigenmittel der Gründer auskommt, ist es wahrschein-
lich, dass die Unternehmer bei einer verlustbehafteten Unternehmensschließung auch 
selbst finanziell betroffen sind. Entsprechend eingeschränkt werden würde der finanzielle 
Spielraum der Unternehmer. Eine doppelte Bedeutung hat es wenn Banken durch eine 
Unternehmensschließung finanzielle Verluste davontragen. Zum einen gehen finanzielle 
Verluste bei Banken auch sehr wahrscheinlich mit privaten finanziellen Verlusten bei den 
Unternehmern einher. Zum anderen würde der Zugang zu neuen Krediten eingeschränkt, 
was die Finanzierung einer erneuten Unternehmensgründung erschweren würde. 
Diese Untersuchung zeigt, dass finanzielle Verluste, die im Zuge einer Unternehmens-
schließung anfallen, sich nur dann auf die Neustartwahrscheinlichkeit auswirken, wenn 
Banken oder öffentliche Institutionen sie zu tragen haben. Gegenüber Schließungen, bei 
denen Verluste von anderen zu tragen sind, ist dann ein Neustart unwahrscheinlicher. 
Auch der Grund, weshalb ein Unternehmen geschlossen wurde, spielt eine wichtige Rolle. 
Gegenüber anderen Schließungsgründen ist die Neustartwahrscheinlichkeit höher, wenn 
Meinungsverschiedenheiten in der Geschäftsführung ein Grund für die Unternehmens-
schließung waren. Die Indikatoren, die auf ein unternehmerisches Scheitern als Ursache 
für die Unternehmensschließung hindeuten, zeigen dagegen keine signifikanten Effekte. 
Dies ist unerwartet, da in früheren Untersuchungen solche Indikatoren signifikante Effek-
te zeigen. Dies könnte jedoch darauf zurückzuführen sein, dass in den früheren Studien 
keine Angaben über angefallene finanzielle Verluste zur Verfügung standen und unbe-
rücksichtigt bleiben mussten. 
Finanzielle Verluste, die durch eine Unternehmensschließung entstehen, haben Einfluss 
auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines unternehmerischen Neustarts – wenn Banken die Verlus-
te zu tragen haben. Entsprechend den Ergebnissen ist es für einen Unternehmer bedeut-
sam, im Zuge der Unternehmensschließung finanzielle Verluste bei Banken zu vermeiden 
oder zumindest gering zu halten, sollte eine Fortsetzung der unternehmerischen Karriere 
nach der Unternehmensschließung beabsichtigt sein. 
Firm closure, financial losses and the consequences for  
an entrepreneurial restart 
Georg Metzger 
ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim 
P.O.Box 103443 
68034 Mannheim, Germany 
Phone: +49 621 1235-185, e-mail: metzger@zew.de 
www.zew.de 
Abstract 
Many entrepreneurs who close a business are actually willing to venture anew. However, 
to realize a restart is not only a matter of willingness on the part of the entrepreneur but 
also of its feasibility. Regarding the feasibility of a restart, the aspect of capital acquisi-
tion might be particularly precarious for renascent entrepreneurs since business closures 
are likely to come up with financial losses. Financial losses arising from business closure 
can befall various stakeholders: shareholders, banks and public institutions, or suppliers 
and other stakeholders. The major finding of this analysis is that financial losses due to 
business closure strongly influence the likelihood of entrepreneurial restart – yet only 
when losses are incurred by banks. Losses which are incurred privately by the entrepre-
neurs or by other stakeholders do not influence the restart likelihood. Entrepreneurs who 
would seek to continue their entrepreneurial career after a business closure would be well 
advised to avoid causing losses at banks. 
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 Introduction 
Entrepreneurs who have abandoned a business must weigh a number of personal, social 
and economic factors when deciding to start a new business (Dyer, 1994). Yet the act of 
restarting presupposes both willingness on the part of the entrepreneur and its objective 
feasibility. Rational entrepreneurs’ willingness to restart is primarily influenced by the 
expectancy of future self-employment profits compared to other income alternatives. 
While the former lies within the purview of the entrepreneur, the latter may be deter-
mined to large extent by external individuals and institutions – particularly in the case of 
a previous business failure and/or financial losses. This is also recognized by Stam et al. 
(2006) who note: “[…] how the prior business of the ex-entrepreneur was terminated […] 
impact not just the post-entrepreneurial career in general, but also renascent entrepre-
neurship in particular” (Stam et al., 2006, p. 8). 
To date no study analyzing the effects of different types of abandoning a business on the 
restart likelihood (e.g. Metzger, 2008 or Stam et al., 2006) has attempted to differ be-
tween the willingness of entrepreneurs to restart and its objective feasibility. This article 
aims to address this gap in scholarship. By including measures that account for stake-
holder groups who bear financial losses arising from business closure, feasibility can be 
approximated and its effects on the likelihood of an entrepreneurial restart can be ana-
lyzed. To do so, unique data of foundations in Germany is used containing information 
about financial losses due to business closures. 
Entrepreneurial restarts 
Many entrepreneurs who close a business are discouraged and choose the exit option, 
i.e. turn their backs on entrepreneurship (Ronstadt, 1986). Others are unflagging. They 
engage in several firms swallowing also business failures before they find “their” business 
(Ronstadt, 1982). Renascent entrepreneurs i.e. entrepreneurs who closed a business and 
prepare their restart can be characterized by several factors. One of the first analyses 
which considered such latent restarters is that of Wagner (2003). He investigated in 
which respects entrepreneurs who had ‘closed or given up’ a firm in the past and who 
toying with the idea to venture anew differ from those who leave the entrepreneurial ca-
reer path. Relying on survey data he found that especially entrepreneurs who are young-
ish and higher educated aspire to take the second chance. The latent restarters are, in 
addition, comparatively less risk averse and have rather more contact with other start-up 
entrepreneurs. Stam et al. (2006) also used survey data to characterize renascent entre-
preneurs and came to the conclusion that the human capital of the ex-entrepreneurs is 
indeed very relevant. Highly educated entrepreneurs and those with multiple-
entrepreneurial experiences are more prone to restart than others, as are entrepreneurs 
who abandon a business by the way of selling it. The human capital effect is confirmed 
by Schutjens and Stam (2006). Based on a small sample analysis, they show that ex-
perience is crucial and positively affects restart probability. 
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 Derivation of hypotheses 
The reasons why entrepreneurs close their business are many and diverse. Closures may 
be the result of economic pressures, such as insolvency or bankruptcy, or strategic rea-
sons, such as an effort to avoid bankruptcy or absolve guarantee claims. In most cases 
closures are not economically inevitable. Entrepreneurs often close businesses ‘voluntar-
ily’ in order to return to the workforce, enter retirement, make a clean break and open a 
different business, or due to health reasons, etc. Yet regardless of the ultimate cause of 
closure, its occurrence can be emotionally burdening for the entrepreneur (Sheperd, 
2003). Once ‘discouraged’ (Stokes and Blackburn, 2001), entrepreneurs may conclude 
they are not up to the task of self-employment, as they ‘learn’ about their own inabilities 
(Jovanovic, 1982). This depresses the profit expectations of further self-employment and 
may prevent restart if profit expectations are negative, i.e., below that expected from an 
alternative mode of employment. This scenario is particularly likely in the case of busi-
ness failure, when entrepreneurs are more inclined to become pessimistic about future 
attempts (McGrath, 1999). While discouraged entrepreneurs may have a lowered willing-
ness to start afresh, the feasibility of establishing a new business may also be restricted.  
Metzger (2008) analyzed the occurrence of real restarts considering particularly the ef-
fect of how a previous business was abandoned. Failed entrepreneurs i.e. entrepreneurs 
who closed a cash-strapped firm voluntarily or went bankrupt are less likely to restart 
than other experienced entrepreneurs who closed a firm. However, if entrepreneurs 
chose unlimited liability legal forms, capital constraints can lower the restart probability 
additionally. Business failure due to bankruptcy is likely to impede restart owing to the 
financial affliction by remaining debts and financing problems resulting from the failure. 
However, if the legal form of the former business stands for capital protection due to lim-
ited liability the type of failure does not matter that much. The findings of Metzger 
(2008) give an idea about how financial afflictions resulting from abandoning a business 
affect the restart likelihood since the occurrence of start-up financing problems depends 
on the type of business closure (Metzger, 2007a). He shows that particularly previous 
bankruptcy increases the likelihood to be faced with start-up financing problems. Conse-
quently, both the existence of and the access to financial means seem to be restricted in 
case of previous business failure. 
However, since the data applied in Metzger (2008) does not allow a disentanglement be-
tween willingness and feasibility he cannot differ between effects resulting from negative 
expectancies and capital restrictions. Information about the occurrence of real financial 
losses resulting from business closure can help to separate these effects. Financial losses 
arising from business closure can impact various stakeholders: shareholders, banks and 
public institutions, or suppliers and other stakeholders. It is reasonable to expect that 
financial losses impact the likelihood of a restart as a function of the stakeholders who 
have been forced to bear losses. Four out of five start-ups capitalize on entrepreneurs’ 
own capital, one out of five start-ups applies banks loans and further 20 percent utilizes 
money from family and friends (Metzger, 2007a). There is thus a high probability that 
entrepreneurs themselves are financially affected by losses incurred from business clo-
sure, which, as a consequence, reduces personal wealth, the fundament of future ac-
tions.  
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 However, it is of twofold importance if banks suffer losses. First, losses at banks are 
likely to be strong correlated with personal losses of the entrepreneurs reducing entre-
preneurs’ personal wealth. Second, losses at banks are “public” debts impeding the 
chance of credit from other banks. Credit defaults are recorded by credit bureaus. This 
worsens an entrepreneurs’ credit rating and, as a consequence, reduces the chance for a 
credit approval. Even if the latter point might be less problematic in Germany, where 
individuals and firms traditionally do not hop between banks, but rather cultivate a 
strong relationship with one principal bank, a so-called Hausbank (house bank), losses at 
banks can diminish entrepreneurs’ personal wealth and block banks as a source of financ-
ing, both are bad for restart feasibility. 
On the basis of the discussed theoretical arguments and existing empirical evidence fol-
lowing hypotheses can be derived: 
H1:  Business closures which can be considered as failure lowers entre-
preneurs’ expectancy about future net profits of self-employment 
and reduces restart likelihood. 
H2:  Financial losses resulting from business closure incurred by share-
holders constrain entrepreneurs’ financial leeway and reduce restart 
likelihood more than losses at other stakeholders. 
H3:  Financial losses resulting from business closure incurred by banks 
constrain entrepreneurs’ financial leeway and reduce restart likeli-
hood. 
Data 
In order to conduct the analysis the ZEW Entrepreneurship Study is applied. The data is 
based on 12,000 observations that have been included in a telephone survey that was 
carried out between March 1999 and March 2000 among German entrepreneurs who es-
tablished firms in the years 1990 until 1993. All of these firms operated in the manufac-
turing, construction, trade or selected service sectors and didn’t have the legal forms of 
freelance, registered society or registered cooperative. Firms from the ZEW Foundation 
Panel form the parent population for this survey. This panel is based on data provided by 
Creditreform in semi-annual waves. Creditreform is the largest German credit rating bu-
reau with a comprehensive database of German firms at its disposal. 
The survey collected information to the establishment of the interviewed entrepreneurs’ 
firms (e.g. legal status, founding year, and industry affiliation), a possible market exit 
(e.g. exit year, reasons, and financial losses), a possible restart of any of the entrepre-
neurs involved in the closed firm (occurrence), and many other firm and entrepreneur 
characteristics. The observed firms are all independent establishments, i.e. are no 
branches of other firms. A detailed discussion of the survey is found in Almus et al. 
(2001). 
Concerning the approach used to obtain firm information, several attempts have been 
made to contact an appropriate interview partner. A firm representative was tried to be 
called on the basis of the last known firm contact details but (maximum two) firm partici-
pants including owners and managers were also tried to be called at their home ad-
 3 
 dresses, if the attempt to contact the firm was unsuccessful. Applying this approach, also 
already closed firms could have been surveyed, which is a distinctive feature of this 
study.  
With 3,702 complete interviews out of the 12,000 sample observations, the response 
rate was about 31 percent, which is high compared to other German studies conducted 
by telephone. 1,008 cases of all observation refer to businesses that were already closed 
at the time of the survey. 
In 237 cases out of the about one thousand observations the interviewees stated that a 
former entrepreneur of the closed firm restarted, i.e. established a new business in the 
meanwhile. Running the analyses with this information, however, would approve two 
limitations. Firstly, a number of interviewees said that they actually do not know about 
the venture activities of the closed firms’ former entrepreneurs. Secondly, a long time 
passed since the survey was conducted resulting in outdated information about the ven-
ture activities gathered in the study. Either of both issues advises to look for additional 
information about the venture activities of the relevant individuals. To do so, the entre-
preneurs who participated in a closed venture were traced in the data deliveries of 
Creditreform following subsequently to the state of the ZEW Foundation Panel which 
forms the parent population of the survey. With this approach it was possible to identify 
225 additional restarts up top the year 2007 which wouldn’t have been considered refer-
ring solely to the survey data. 
Selection of variables 
The hypotheses are tested within a multivariate framework. The occurrence of an entre-
preneurial restart is the dependent variable in a probit estimation. The dependent vari-
able RESTART equals one if an entrepreneur of a closed business’ entrepreneurial team 
ventures anew and zero otherwise. Two different specifications are fitted. In the first 
specification the second set of main covariates, i.e. the variables indicating which group 
of stakeholders incurs financial losses, is omitted and then introduced in the second 
specification. This enables to identify possible effect which may arise from an omitted 
variable bias if neglecting these variables.  
As shown in Table 1 the introduced independent variables can be subdivided into main 
covariates and other control variables. Two primary sets of explanatory variables are in-
troduced to account for different closure reasons and for the stakeholder groups which 
have suffered financial losses from closure. Other ancillary independent variables control 
for specific firm characteristics; these include governance, legal status, size, location and 
industry affiliation 
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 Table 1: Definition of variables 





Main covariates I: Closure reasons a    
DEBTS = 1  if closure due to excessive debts H1 - 
NOTWORTH = 1  if closure because business didn’t meet entrepreneur’s target 
performance threshold 
 ? 
ILLIQUIDITY = 1  if closure due to liquidity problems H1 - 
WAGEEMPL = 1  if closure because entrepreneur transitioned to workforce  - 
RETIRE = 1  if closure because entrepreneur went into retirement  - 
PRIVATE = 1  if closure because of private reasons  ? 
OTHERREAS = 1  if closure because of other reasons  ? 
QUARREL = 1  if closure due to differences within the entrepreneur team 
(the effect of this variable has to be interpreted jointly with 
the TEAM indicator) 
 ? 
Main covariates II: Bearer of financial losses a    
SHAREHOL = 1  if entrepreneurs incurred financial losses due to the business 
closure 
H2 - 
BANKS = 1  if banks or public institutions incurred financial losses due to 
the business closure 
H3 - 
OTHERSTAKE = 1  if other stakeholders (like suppliers) incurred financial losses 
due to the business closure 
 ? 
Control variables    
CAPITAL = Amount of start-up capital utilized in the closed firm (in ‘000 €)  ? 
CAPITALM = 1 if the amount of capital is not available   
TEAM = 1  if firm was ruled by an entrepreneur team  + 
TEAMM = 1  if the TEAM indicator is missing   
LIMITED = 1  if the firm’s legal status was liability limiting  0 
SIZE = # of employees at firm closure  + 
SIZEM = 1  if firm size is not available   
AGE = Age of the closed firm (in years)  ? 
AGEM = 1  if firm age is not available   
EAST = 1  if the firm was located in East Germany  0 
HTIND = 1 if the firms was affiliated in a high-tech industry sector  0 
OTHERIND = 1 if the firms was affiliated in a non-high-tech industry sector  + 
TECHSERV = 1 if the firms was affiliated in a high-tech service sector  + 
OTHERSERV = 1 if the firms was affiliated in a non-high-tech service sector  + 
CONSTRUCT = 1 if the firms was affiliated in construction  + 
TRADE = 1 if the firms was affiliated in trade services  + 
a Multiple statements were possible. 
Note: The expected signs of the control variables’ effects are suggested by the findings of Metzger (2008). 
There are different closure reasons that could be developed from the interviewees an-
swers, which led to eight indicators. The indicator DEBTS refers to closures due to exces-
sive debts. It is a closure reason that suggests business failure and which is thus an ap-
propriate indicator to test hypothesis H1 owing to which negative effects are expected. 
NOTWORTH is a further closure reason variable. It refers to closures that occur because 
they do not meet the entrepreneurs’ target threshold of performance. However, no ex-
pectation about the effect of this measure is derived. At the one hand, entrepreneurs 
who close a business because they recognize that a going concern is not worth it, might 
regard themselves as being failed preventing them from restart. At the other hand, they 
may hold the opinion that this experience improved their entrepreneurial talent confirm-
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 ing them to restart. Another indicator is ILLIQUIDITY. It refers to closures due to liquidity 
problems. Concerning ILLIQUIDITY the similar applies as with regard to the before dis-
cussed measure NOTWORTH: there is no clear expectation about how it affects restart 
likelihood. ILLIQUIDITY may be an equivalent indicator for failure as DEBTS is, however, 
illiquidity can also be a problem of firms which are basically economically sound. One 
single big customer with default in payment is sufficient to plunge a firm into liquidity 
distress. 
The variables WAGEEMPL and RETIRE refer to closures which occur because entrepre-
neurs either changed into wage employment or went into retirement. Due to such a shift 
of the income source negative effects on the restart likelihood are expected. Finally, the 
variable PRIVATE refers to business closures because of private reasons, OTHERREAS 
refers to other not further specified reasons, and QUARREL refers to quarrels within the 
entrepreneur team. Since the latter closure reason is only possible if there is an entre-
preneur team, effects referring to it have to be interpreted jointly with the indicator ac-
counting for team governance. For all three variables PRIVATE, OTHERREAS, and QUAR-
REL no expectations about the effects are derived. 
Results 
Table 2 shows the mean values of the introduced independent variables. Almost a quar-
ter of the surveyed closures can be considered as business failures since in 24 percent of 
the closures excessive debts play a major role. The target thresholds of performance 
were missed in 38 percent of the closures. Liquidity problems contribute in 45 percent of 
the cases to the closure decision. About 6 percent of the closures exited because entre-
preneurs changed into wage employment, while a change into retirement are relevant for 
4 percent of the closures. Private or other reasons were important in 13 and 21 percent 
of the closure cases. Finally, quarrel within the entrepreneur team plays a role in about 
14 percent of the closures. 
”Entrepreneurs risk their financial well-being, career opportunities, family relations, and 
physical well-being” (Liles, 1974). This recognition is fairly true as the 61 percent share 
of entrepreneurs who incurred financial losses due to their business closure suggests. At 
a first glance, this finding does not agree with Dennis and Fernald (2001) who note that 
“the chances of financial success in terms of change in personal financial condition are 
substantially greater than the chances of loss“. Stating so they refer to their findings 
based on exits implying both exits due to real closures and due to sale of shareholdings. 
Indeed, a exit of the latter type is associated with a freeing of capital (Stam et al., 2006) 
and probably with capital gains. However, referring solely on business closures the data 
of Dennis and Fernald (2001) also show that slightly more than half of all entrepreneurs 
suffer losses due to business closure which is comparable with the finding herein. Banks 
and public institutions suffered losses in 22 percent of the closures, while in 31 percent of 
the closures other stakeholder like suppliers must incur losses. 
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 Table 2: Variable means 
Variable Mean Unit Variable Mean Unit 
Main covariates I: Closure reasons a   Control variables   
DEBTS 23.7 % CAPITAL 64.7 ‘000 € 
NOTWORTH 37.9 % CAPITALM 33.9 % 
ILLIQUIDITY 45.3 % TEAM 55.5 % 
WAGEEMPL 5.5 % TEAMM 7.3 % 
RETIRE 4.1 % LIMITED 48.9 % 
PRIVATE 12.8 % SIZE 11.8 # Employees 
OTHERREAS 21.2 % SIZEM 8.4 % 
QUARREL 13.7 % AGE 4.1 Years 
   AGEM 3.6 % 
Main covariates II: Bearer of financial losses a   EAST 51.6 % 
SHAREHOL 61.0 % HTIND 2.0 % 
BANKS 21.6 % OTHERIND 11.4 % 
OTHERSTAKE 30.7 % TECHSERV 4.8 % 
   OTHERSERV 6.8 % 
   CONSTRUCT 20.5 % 
   TRADE 37.1 % 
a Multiple statements were possible. 
Source: ZEW Entrepreneurship Study. 
The measures WAGEEMPL and RETIRE indicate a shift in the source of income. However, 
as WAGEEMPL is insignificant, a return to the workforce does not affect the likelihood of 
restart. RETIRE, by contrast, is significantly negative, meaning that in most cases enter-
ing retirement is a final decision. A significantly negative effect on the likelihood of re-
start is also associated with the variable PRIVATE. Business closure due to private rea-
sons such as illness makes restart more unlikely, while OTHERREAS, i.e., unspecified 
other reasons, is insignificant, thus having no impact. If an argument within the entre-
preneurial team was a reason for business closure, this seems – for logical reasons – to 
encourage entrepreneurs to venture anew; the effect of QUARREL is significantly positive. 
Table 3 provides the probit estimation results. Effects arising from the closure-reason 
indicators are shown in the upper part of the table followed by the effects arising from 
the loss measures in the lower part. The second and third row presents results for the 
first specification which omits the loss indicators. The effect of the measure DEBTS is 
significantly positive in this first specification. There is thus evidence that closures indica-
tive of business failure reduce the likelihood of restart, confirming the findings of 
Metzger, 2008). NOTWORTH is not significant either, meaning that if entrepreneurs close 
a business because it fails to meet their target performance threshold, their restart prob-
ability is not affected by this experience. Liquidity problems are the most important clo-
sure reason, but do not affect the restart decision, as suggested by the insignificance of 
the ILLIQUIDITY indicator. 
The measures WAGEEMPL and RETIRE indicate a shift in the source of income. However, 
as WAGEEMPL is insignificant, a return to the workforce does not affect the likelihood of 
restart. RETIRE, by contrast, is significantly negative, meaning that in most cases enter-
ing retirement is a final decision. A significantly negative effect on the likelihood of re-
start is also associated with the variable PRIVATE. Business closure due to private rea-
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 sons such as illness makes restart more unlikely, while OTHERREAS, i.e., unspecified 
other reasons, is insignificant, thus having no impact. If an argument within the entre-
preneurial team was a reason for business closure, this seems – for logical reasons – to 
encourage entrepreneurs to venture anew; the effect of QUARREL is significantly positive. 
Table 3: Probit estimation results 
Specification I Specification II Independent variable: 
Occurrence of restart (yes/no) 
Marginal effect a P-value Marginal effect a P-value 
Main covariates I: Closure reasons b c  
DEBTS -0,082 ** 0,041 -0,061  0,143 
NOTWORTH 0,007  0,859 -0,001  0,988 
ILLIQUIDITY 0,012  0,723 0,027  0,463 
WAGEEMPL 0,036  0,634 0,036  0,639 
RETIRE -0,247 *** 0,000 -0,254 *** 0,000 
PRIVATE -0,106 ** 0,044 -0,107 ** 0,040 
OTHERREAS 0,038  0,374 0,038  0,372 
QUARREL 0,193 *** 0,000 0,192 *** 0,000 
Main covariates II: Bearer of financial losses b  
SHAREHOL -  - -0,017  0,645 
BANKS -  - -0,112 ** 0,013 
OTHERSTAKE -  - 0,024  0,573 
Control variables  
CAPITAL 0,000  0,482 0,000  0,412 
CAPITALM -0,010  0,771 -0,008  0,830 
TEAM 0,134 *** 0,000 0,135 *** 0,000 
TEAMM 0,005  0,946 -0,005  0,941 
LIMITED 0,161 *** 0,000 0,158 *** 0,000 
SIZE 0,003 *** 0,001 0,003 *** 0,001 
SIZEM 0,043  0,443 0,043  0,433 
AGE -0,023 *** 0,001 -0,022 *** 0,001 
AGEM -0,144  0,129 -0,154  0,108 
EAST -0,037  0,237 -0,035  0,264 
HTIND -0,006  0,961 -0,008  0,943 
OTHERIND 0,020  0,749 0,025  0,681 
TECHSERV 0,230 *** 0,001 0,232 *** 0,001 
OTHERSERV 0,131 * 0,054 0,132 * 0,051 
CONSTRUCT 0,107 ** 0,034 0,111 ** 0,027 
TRADE 0,080 * 0,074 0,083 * 0,063 
# of observations 853   853   
Wald χ2 (df) 146.820 (20)  159.330 (27)  
Pseudo R2 0.161   0.168   
a Average marginal effect. 
b No reference category because multiple statements were possible. 
c Actually, there is another closure reason indicator available namely “change into a different self-employment 
business”. Since this indicator would completely determine the outcome in the regression, 13 observations 
which exclusively refer to this closure reason are not used. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 5 % level. *** Significant at the 1 % level. 
Note: Both indictors variance inflation factor and condition number do not indicate a multicollinearity problem. 
Source: Own regression based on the ZEW Entrepreneurship Study and the ZEW Foundation Panel. 
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 The fourth and fifth rows provide the results for the second, fully specified estimation. 
The financial loss indicators capture effects which were associated in the first specifica-
tion with closure reasons. Contrary to the results of the first specification, the findings of 
the second specification show that DEBTS now does not significantly affect the likelihood 
of restart. Closures indicative of failure thus have no influence on whether or not entre-
preneurs restart – a surprising finding, indicating that entrepreneurs are neither discour-
aged when their business fails, nor do they come to the conclusion they are unfit for self-
employment. However, this is in line with findings of Stokes and Blackburn (2002), who 
report that entrepreneurs believe they can certainly succeed with another business even 
after having failed. Such a view may not be rational, but is the result of  psychological 
defence mechanisms by which individuals blame external circumstances – such as an 
unfavourable economic climate – for their failure rather than their own incapacities (see 
Van den Steen, 2004 for a compilation of relevant citations). 
The financial loss indicators also reveal some interesting effects. Surprisingly, the vari-
able SHAREHOL was not significant. This contradicts expectations: if shareholders, i.e., 
the entrepreneurs, suffer financial losses due to business closure, this plays no role in the 
likelihood of restart. This finding could mean that entrepreneurs are often able to rescue 
a large portion of their private capital after being forced to close their business. However, 
it could also mean that entrepreneurs who restart are simply able to acquire the capital 
they need, regardless of the depletion of their private resources. 
By contrast, results for the BANKS variable conform with expectations. The effect is 
negatively significant meaning that financial losses due to business closure considerably 
lower the likelihood of restart. 
Implications 
The results of this study have some important implications for both policymakers and 
entrepreneurs. Actually, the political position concerning failed entrepreneurs is that one 
should “promote the fresh start of previously failed businesses, by enabling and empow-
ering them to begin new activities without being hindered by restrictions [because they] 
do learn from their mistakes and are more successful in the future” (European Commis-
sion, 2002, p. 9). In the recent years several multivariate empirical studies refute this 
outperformance myth (Kay et al., 2004, Metzger, 2006, Metzger, 2007b, Ucbasaran et 
al., 2006), which was started or at least revived by a study of BCG (Boston Consulting 
Group, 2002). In consequence these studies query the claim for special support. The 
findings herein show, however, that solely the fact of business failure does not deter en-
trepreneurs from restart. Even if the failure results in private financial losses entrepre-
neurs’ restart likelihood remains unaffected. This is different to the occurrence of finan-
cial losses at banks or public institutions. Such kind of losses reduces restart likelihood. 
Many of persons might argue now, that this is the proof for the need of special support 
particularly since one knows that previously failed entrepreneurs are more likely to have 
financing difficulties (Metzger, 2007a). However, it must be clear that any person having 
debts at banks typically will have problems to get money independent if she is a previ-
ously failed entrepreneur or not. For example, novice entrepreneurs who are burdened 
with old debts are likely to have financing difficulties, too. Doubts in the claim for particu-
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 lar public support are also endorsed by the fact, that if previously failed entrepreneurs 
actually restart, their start-up financing composition and the financing sources tapped are 
not significantly different from that of other entrepreneurs (Metzger, 2007a) suggesting 
that entrepreneurs who want to restart select themselves into adequate financing. 
However, the major finding of this analysis is that financial losses due to business closure 
strongly influence the likelihood of entrepreneurial restart – yet only when losses are 
incurred by banks. This has an important implication for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs 
who would seek to continue their entrepreneurial career after a business closure would 
be well advised to avoid causing losses at banks or at public financial institutions. This 
advice is worth heeding if a business does not meet entrepreneur’s target performance 
threshold. Then, entrepreneurs either can keep the ailing business afloat or can fore-
sightedly close the business. Frequently, entrepreneurs forfeit the opportunity for a well-
managed closure in such a situation because they overly optimistic trust in better times. 
However, in doing so, they risk a worsening of the business’ economic situation that con-
sequently would deteriorate their restart chances.1  
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